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I. INTRODUCTION
The Israel Defense Forces (the IDF) is well versed in conducting
ground operations. Since its inception along with the establishment of
the State of Israel in 1948, the IDF has conducted a number of
ground operations, as part of conflicts both long and short, against
various actors, and in different circumstances. The Independence
War of 1948, the Six Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of
1973 provided experience with ground operations against organized
Major General Nitsan Alon is the Head of the IDF Operations Directorate,
responsible in the IDF for planning and coordinating the use of force (equivalent to the
U.S. Armed Forces J3). General Alon has held a number of command posts in the IDF,
including General Officer Commanding of the Central Command. He has been awarded
the IDF Chief of Staff Citation and holds a Bachelor of Science in Physics and
Materials Engineering. This Article is based on a presentation delivered at the 2nd IDF
International Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict, held in Tel Aviv, Israel,
between April 25 and 27, 2017. The author would like to thank Brigadier General
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Commanding General), for his comments and suggestions.
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state militaries. The large-scale maneuver in the First Lebanon War
of 1982 and the more limited maneuver in the Second Lebanon War
of 2006 are examples of ground operations against non-state armed
groups (NSAGs) operating in the territory of other states. And the
limited maneuvers in the Gaza Conflicts of 2008-09 and 2014 are
examples of ground operations against NSAGs operating in territory
under their full control.
In the more recent of these conflicts the IDF's operations have
been increasingly drawn into the urban terrain. This, together with
the manner in which our adversaries exploit such surroundings to
their advantage, has presented a number of challenges and
complexities that do not generally arise in ground operations divorced
from the civilian context. On the basis of the IDF's experience with
such operations, this Article intends to explain the necessity of
ground operations as part of warfare occurring in the urban terrain
(Part II), to consider some of the operational complexities involved in
such operations (Part III), and to briefly and partially present the
IDF's response to such challenges (Part IV).
II. THE NECESSITY FOR GROUND OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
Ground operations in urban areas generate unique tactical,
humanitarian, and political challenges.
Ask any experienced and educated military commander, and he
or she will tell you that the urban battlefield presents the most
complex tactical challenges of any of the possible battle arenas. This
is not true only of present day conflicts. A brief study of the Battle of
Stalingrad in World War II, the Battles of the Suez Canal in 1956 or
the First Battle of Grozny in 1994, for example, will demonstrate
clearly how the urban theater makes warfare exceedingly difficult
and decisive victory elusive. Physical structures limit movement,
reduce the range of means available, conceal enemy positions, prior-
emplaced explosives, military assets, and movement, and increase the
spaces from which attacks may emanate. Every single structure has
the potential to be a military asset and pose a threat to the advancing
forces. The very deployment of forces into combat exposes them to
harm-both direct harm from fire as well as through other means
(such as abduction)-and all the more so in the confined spaces of the
urban theater.' Essentially, urban surroundings encumber the ability
of forces to achieve their mission.
1. This is particularly so in Israel's case, as in recent years the abduction of
soldiers has become a strategic goal of our adversaries. Indeed, more recently our
adversaries' military operations have been aimed less at directly harming our forces
and more at capturing them.
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Ground operations in urban areas also create humanitarian
challenges, as the presence of hostilities necessarily creates risks for
the populace, and forces are required to factor in such risks to their
actions as well as to adapt when such risk translates into actual
instances of civilian harm. This is particularly so for militaries such
as the IDF, whose ethics include mitigating the risk of harm to
civilians as much as possible. Civilian risk of harm is not an element
that we wish to-or can-ignore when conducting operations. This
includes mitigating the risk of damage to civilian infrastructure as
well, such as sewerage and water services-both because the
continued functioning of infrastructure reduces the risk that civilians
will expose themselves to harm by searching for access to such
services, and also because it means our forces will need to divert less
resources to providing or facilitating such services. Yet the need to
exercise substantial force to achieve the mission and to preserve one's
forces is oftentimes at odds with the desire to minimize the risk of
civilian harm and damage to the surroundings, creating significant
challenges.
Finally, ground operations also incur political costs-in the very
decision to send one's soldiers into harm's way, in the risk that the
withdrawal of ground forces from the battlefield will be perceived as
surrender or retreat, and in the risk of criticism (both internally and
internationally) regarding civilian harm. In today's world, conflicts
are also fought in the realm of public opinion and international fora-
adding additional elements to achieving "mission completion" such as
retaining international legitimacy and avoiding harm to the state's
stature.2
Thus, it is perhaps not for nothing that many democratic states
are reluctant to put "boots on the ground" and have generally limited
themselves to aerial and stand-off operations alone, even when it
comes at a price.3 Indeed, why do states send their militaries to
conduct ground operations in urban areas at all?
First, there are tactical aims that can only be achieved by
introducing forces on the ground. Some military objectives and
2. The political element has found expression in foundational IDF documents,
such as the "IDF Strategy Document" published under the direction of the current IDF
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, in 2015. LIEUTENANT GENERAL GADI
EIZENKOT, Israel Defense Forces Strategy Document, https://www.belfercenter.org/
israel-defense-forces-strategy-document [h tps://perma.cc/DR5Z-X7UC] (archived Mar.
29, 2018) (emphasis added) (unofficial translation of the uncensored version). Under
the heading "Principles of the National Security Doctrine," it is stated "the use of force
will be carried out with resolve in order to achieve the political goals while operating in
accordance with the rules of international law . . . and safeguarding Israel's
legitimacy." Id.
3. Consider, for example, the discourse between Western states in the
international community regarding the military operations in Libya in 2011, as well as
the more recent operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, during which the ground
operations were primarily conducted by local Iraqi forces.
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OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IN GROUND OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS
an area is secure and forces take up defensive positions, they will still
need to identify enemy attacks and engage them.
Target identification is difficult under any conditions of warfare.
Inevitable uncertainties exist in combat, a fact which has been
captured neatly in the term "fog of war." Despite best efforts and
planning, it is rare to possess a full picture in the zone of combat.
Intelligence is never perfect, and the dynamics of warfare-explosive
force, danger to life and limb, and general commotion-do not ease
efforts to obtain information in the midst of it all.
Yet target identification is especially difficult in ground
operations, where risk to the forces and their equipment on the
ground often means that action is required even in the fog of war. If a
ground force maneuvering towards a certain point receives incoming
fire and is under threat of harm, then even without being able to
locate the exact source of the fire, they will likely need to act in order
to disrupt, suppress, or stop that fire so that they may complete their
mission and preserve their forces.
This is particularly so in urban areas, where the fog of war is
typically particularly dense. Here, ground forces receiving incoming
fire while searching house-to-house for rocket launchers may find it
particularly difficult to identify the source of incoming fire for the
reasons detailed above-physical structures conceal the adversary's
positions and assets, tunnels allow for executing fire and immediately
moving in a concealed fashion to another position, and infrastructure
interrupts the lines of sight required to identify far-off attacks. Forces
are required, quickly and while under fire, to decide how to react.
19 In
other cases, the particular target may be difficult to locate-a mission
to capture a specific person, for example, is particularly difficult in a
densely populated area comprising countless places where such a
person could be.2 0
In the urban context, forces must work with the knowledge that
anything could contain Q threat-a wine cellar may be a coordination
point for different attacks; a passing truck may contain explosives; a
young man looking through a window may be passing intelligence to
an anti-tank squad behind him; even animals may be primed to
19. For an example of an instance where ground forces under fire were
required to make a decision whether to carry out return fire with only partial
information see pages 184-85 of the 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 10. In this
instance, "IDF forces dismantling tunnel infrastructure in Bir el-Balah were fired upon
with what appeared to be a long-range anti-tank missile. The forces refrained from
returning fire, as they could not determine whether the four-story building from which
the enemy fire originated was populated and because they were aware that it was
prayer time at a nearby mosque." Id. at 184.
20. Consider, for example, the manhunt to locate former Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein in 2003, which took many months and required house-by-house
searches based on a substantial intelligence effort and a significant deployment of
forces in order to locate a single, heavily disguised, person.
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explode.21 Forces do not enter a suburb and search only for the object
with military markings or camouflage-rather, everything has the
potential to cause harm and threats are not distinguishable by visual
markings alone. Thus, forces tasked with destroying a command and
control center in their area of operation do not walk through the
neighborhood just looking for a site that appears military in nature-
rather, the command and control center could be the local school's
computer room, the administration office of the local religious
community center, or even a work-study in a house. If there is
intelligence of an impending ambush, forces do not look out just for
armed men in uniforms-they know that an approaching donkey
could be laden with explosives, or that the approaching ambulance
could contain militants.
And target identification is even more difficult when facing an
adversary that deliberately tries to negate any distinction between, on
the one hand, its military activities and militants, and, on the other
hand, the civilian surroundings and civilians themselves. Hamas'
uniforms are reserved for military parades; in combat, its militants
are disguised as civilianS22 and travel in civilian vehicles,23 making it
all the more difficult for IDF forces to determine whom is liable for
attack. NSAGs also co-opt the civilian population for military
activities, using women and children to conduct surveillance on the
positions and activities of the ground forces, and to carry arms and
other military equipment from post to post. The adversary is acutely
aware of our values, and know that our forces will hesitate in opening
fire on those who, by their appearance alone, seem to be uninvolved
in the hostilities.
Hezbollah, for its part, has conducted military activities under
the guise of an environmental non-governmental organization.24 As
Figure 14 above demonstrates, Hezbollah has systematically
embedded its military assets and infrastructure in civilian villages
throughout Lebanon. Not only does it make it difficult to ascertain
civilian presence, but it also challenges the capacity to clearly identify
military objectives. Without precise intelligence regarding their
location, uncovering military objectives occurs either when forces
physically find them-or when they are used to fire upon the
21. Hamas Attacks Israeli Soldiers With Explosive Donkey, ISRAELI DEFENSE
FORCES (July 19, 2014), https://www.idf.illen/minisites/hamas/hamas-attacks-israeli-
soldiers-with-explosive-donkey/ [https://perma.cc/8TSE-34YJ] (archived Mar. 29, 2018).
22. See, for example, references to reports by journalists present in the Gaza
Strip during the 2014 Gaza Conflict. 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 10, at 103.
23. See, for example, still images of video footage of Hamas militants using
ambulance with Palestinian Red Crescent Society markings to escape a battlezone. Id.
at 78.
24. See Hezbollah Uses Environmental Organization as Front for Terror
Activity, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.idf.illen/minisites/
hezbollahlhezbollah-uses-environmental-organization-as-front-for-terror-activity/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UH86-5XL9] (archived Mar. 15, 2018).
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advancing forces. Some objectives cannot be clearly identified at all-
how does a soldier determine whether a nearby truck doubles as a
missile transporter, or even a launcher? Whether a loitering female is
providing their exact location to waiting militants? And in the midst
of it all, the surroundings continue to bear the potential to pose a
threat-gas tanks outside a home may double as lethal explosives
and electricity wires may double as their detonators.
IV. THE IDF RESPONSE
Not all these challenges can be resolved, and some will remain
an inherent part of the reality of warfare. Nevertheless, the IDF
continuously looks for ways to improve the commander's ability to
achieve the mission, preserve his or her forces, and minimize the risk
of harm to civilians and the civilian surroundings. These efforts find
expression in: the IDF's training activities; institutional adaptation;
orders and directives; regulations; doctrine; the development of
suitable weapons and other tools; and context-specific preparations.
Training. Thoroughly preparing forces for ground operations in
urban areas is indispensable for achieving these aims. The IDF
operates world-renowned facilities for training forces in urban
warfare and employs simulators and other interactive tools to
simulate the conditions of such fighting. Military exercises
incorporate the full range of elements expected to confront forces in
urban areas, such as civilian presence and unexpected significant
incidents of collateral harm, as well as occasionally integrating
representatives of organizations such as the ICRC to train forces to
operate in complex environments that contain the presence of
different actors.
Institutional Adaptation. The IDF also seeks to implement
institutional changes, developing the composition and structure of
forces to suit the needs of urban warfare. For example, new roles and
command structures have been introduced with the dedicated
responsibility for dealing with the civilian element. Civilian Affairs
Officers accompany commanders in the battlefield, and at higher
levels manage situation rooms, in order to monitor the needs and
locations of the civilian population, provide advice to commanders on
civilian-related issues, and help facilitate the provision of goods and
services.
Regulations. The IDF also enacts binding operational
regulations, directives, and orders that govern the forces' conduct in
the battlefield. Some of these are intended to address particular
issues that arise in the context of urban operations, such as the
measures required when destruction of property is deemed necessary
2018J 759
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for military reasons, or courses of action in the event of attempted
abduction of soldiers or civilians.25 These directives are formulated
together with relevant entities within the IDF, including legal
advisors, in order to ensure their adherence with the law and their
operational relevance. In some cases, these directives impose
restrictions on forces that do not stem from legal requirements, but
rather from additional considerations, humanitarian and otherwise.
Soldiers and commanders also undergo educational courses to ensure
continued familiarity with the relevant directives and their legal
obligations. Courses are individually tailored for the particular roles
and functions of different forces, and expose forces to different
perspectives regarding the environments in which the forces operate,
delivered by representatives of nongovernmental and international
organizations.
Doctrine. IDF doctrine has developed in response to the IDF's
experience with ground maneuvers, particularly in urban areas. For
example, current IDF doctrine dictates that even in situations of full-
scale hostilities, focused and dedicated use of force is to be preferred
over mass deployment, for various reasons, including reduced impact
on the civilian environment.26 Likewise, the awareness of the political
challenges created by urban warfare has also been addressed in IDF
doctrine.27
Weapons Development. The IDF invests in ensuring its forces
possess relevant means for operating in the urban environment. This
includes developing new technologies, such as precision guided
rockets, missiles and mortar shells, delayed fuses, or lower-yield
munitions. It also includes ensuring that forces have a wide range of
tools at their disposal relevant to the urban environment, which could
include riot dispersal means, different tools for breaching doors, or
explosives with varying types of fuses. Binding directives also govern
the use of these means, ensuring that the employment of means takes
into consideration the urban context. For example, artillery remains
an indispensable element of the commander's toolbox, providing
commanders in the field with continuous and responsive fire support.
It provides advantages that cannot easily be found elsewhere-it can
fire at ranges, at speeds, in quantities, and with persistence that
25. See 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 10, at 186 (discussing the IDF
General Staff Directive for Contending with Kidnapping Attempts, also known as the
"Hannibal Directive."). This Directive has since been replaced.
26. The Strategy Document states that "[t]he IDFs principal approach to
achieving victory is the maneuver approach, based on components of pin-pointed
offensive actions against the enemy's weak spots . . . to harm the enemy's decision
making process in order to disrupt the effectiveness of its operations . . . and while
using minimum IDF resources." EIZENKOT, supra note 2, at 16.
27. The IDF Strategy Document, for example, states that "[t]he use of fire will
be tested against the principles of proportionality and ethics, and considerations of
legitimacy will be secondary." Id. at 21.
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cannot be achieved by other means; can provide a large variety of fire
effects, such as disruption, suppression, or neutralization of enemy
forces; and can dominate an entire area simultaneously. In order to
ensure use in accordance with the law and to address the
humanitarian concerns that arise, the IDF maintains directives that
specify the types of effects that artillery may be used for, regulates
the amount of artillery that may be employed in specific situations,
and sets restrictions on the use of artillery in populated areas.2 8
Other Tools. Likewise, the IDF tries to develop tools to assist in
dealing with the populace. Warnings and evacuation orders may be
provided through leaflet drops, pre-recorded phone calls, or radio and
television broadcasts. Joint coordination centers have been
established by IDF, with U.N. and ICRC representatives, to improve
personnel movement, medication evacuations, and aid facilitation.
Infrastructure for supporting the civilian population is integrated
into operational activities-for example, where an external
organization establishes a shelter in a zone of hostilities, the IDF can
integrate its presence into its systems and ensure forces are aware of
its location. Likewise, for organizations repairing damaged
infrastructure in the battlefield such as fallen power lines, IDF forces
can accompany them in order to provide security.
Context-Specific Preparations. Preparations for specific
operations supplement the above. Orders for specific operations allow
for taking into account the particular circumstances of each urban
context. Continued intelligence gathering improves the forces'
knowledge concerning their intended targets and surroundings.
Operational maps marking "sensitive sites," compiled and maintained
in conjunction with international organizations, provide forces with
important information to consider in their operations. Regulated and
multi-tiered processes for approving pre-planned attacks are designed
to ensure that commanders have all reasonably available information
and professional (including legal) advice before deciding whether to
carry out an attack.
Not all these tools and methods are suitable for every conflict,
nor are they feasible to employ in all situations. Each conflict
possesses its own particular complexities; each adversary poses
different challenges; each force maintains different means of warfare
and holds different levels of training and experience; different combat
scenarios entail varying levels of intensity and uncertainty; and
political orders differ from conflict to conflict. Ultimately, we entrust
our commanders with the responsibility to fulfill their duties in a
manner that is suitable to the totality of circumstances they
encounter at the time of their decision-making.
28. See 2014 Gaza Conflict Report, supra note 10, at 190-94 (discussing the
IDF directives setting restrictions on the use of HE artillery shells).
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V. CONCLUSION
Ground operations will likely continue to be an irreplaceable tool
for militaries seeking to achieve the goals provided by the political
echelon. Those states whose civilian homefronts are under direct
threat do not have the privilege to avoid sending their forces into
ground operations and encountering the complexities some of which
are described above.
In contemporary armed conflicts, the steady shift of the
battlefield into the urban arena is likely to continue. This is
particularly so when engaging with non-state armed groups that
deliberately draw the fighting into the urban surroundings and
deliberately endanger their populace. In such a reality, states will
continue to encounter practical challenges, as well as ethical
dilemmas, stemming from the mere presence of urban characteristics
as well as the efforts of our adversaries to exploit our commitment to
the law and Western value systems.
In the face of such facts, militaries such as the IDF must
continue developing tools and methods to contend with the
operational . challenges and complexities presented by ground
operations in urban areas. Doing so will not entirely negate the risk
of harm to one's forces or the civilian population, but that does not
mean we should not try. For its part, the IDF will continue to ensure
its forces are well-trained, educated, and equipped, in order to best
ensure their ability to implement both military necessity and
humanitarian considerations in the fulfillment of their duties.
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